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Title:

Study on Human Elements in the Application of
Automatic Identification System (AIS)

Degree:

Master of Science in Maritime Safety and Environment Protection
Abstract

Shipboard Automatic Identification System (AIS) represents a technological
development that has the potential to offer tangible assistance to both mariners and
shore-based authorities in enhancing navigational safety through identifying vessels,
assisting in target tracking, simplifying information exchange and providing
additional information to assist situation awareness (IMO, 2002).
However, the current status of AIS usage and application is far from initial
expectations and, according to a recent survey and statistics carried in the Port of
Shanghai and a research undertaken in Dover channel, quite a number of shipboard
AIS equipment is either being improperly used or displaying inaccurate information.
Erroneous or incomplete data, ineffective ergonomic designing, unfriendly interface,
mental stress and additional workload induced during the usage, various human errors, etc.
considerably impede AIS to perform all the potential capabilities.
Based on the identification of human elements involved in the application and usage
of AIS, this dissertation tries to analyze how those elements affect the performance
and reliability of AIS. Ergonomic designing and human-machine interface, mental
stress facing automatic devices, workload increased or reduced and, various human
errors will be discussed during the analytic process.
Having analyzed human elements affecting the full capabilities of AIS, this
dissertation urges these concerns to be incorporated in the application and
development of AIS.

Recommendations will be given for the effective combination

of human elements and the better use of this navigational aid.
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Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Importance of the Study
As for the maritime safety, Ma (2005) states that “…seafaring was and remains one
of the most dangerous professions measured in the number of people injured or
killed…” and “…if shipping is already a safety and environmental concern today, it
will be more so in the future”.
Modern technology is one of the efforts to enhance the maritime safety and has
revolutionized the traditional way in which the officer of the watch (OOW) maintains
a safe navigational watch.

In particular, the birth of Automatic Identification

System (AIS) technology has improved the way in which radar images can be
identified with clear static, dynamic and voyage related information.

AIS

technology is revolutionizing surveillance and control of shipping, and as introduced
by Berking (2003), AIS has the potential to become the key element for information
exchange and will play an important role for the efficient and smooth flow of
information among all parties concerned.
According to International Maritime Organization (IMO) Resolution MSC.74 (69)
(IMO, 1998),
The AIS should improve the safety of navigation by assisting in the efficient
navigation of ships, protection of the environment, and operation of Vessel
Traffic Services (VTS), by satisfying the following functional requirements:
.1 in a ship-to-ship mode for collision avoidance;
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.2 as a means for littoral States to obtain information about a ship and its cargo; and
.3 as a VTS tool, i.e. ship-to-shore (traffic management).
It is argued that although the equipment used on ships is becoming more and more
sophisticated, it is not correct to say the technology would provide a solution to
certain problems, because unless properly used technology could make the problem
worse (O’Neil, 1999).

Recognized generally, the contribution of AIS to

navigational safety and shore-based services is principally based on the correct usage
and full application.

Bailey (2005) argues that making effective decisions on the

basis of AIS data requires that the data transmitted is correct and that those receiving
the information are able to interpret it correctly.

Chang (2004) believes the

effectiveness of VTS service depends heavily on the quality of AIS information and
intelligent applications for information processing, integration, and presentation.
However, the current status of usage and application of AIS is far from initial
expectation and, according to a spot check in 2005 August at Shanghai VTS center,
the author found that at least one third of AIS-fitted ships were displaying, more or
less, incomplete and improper information1.

Similarly, the research undertaken at

Dover channel in 2005 showed that from 84 vessels, there were 122 discrete items of
discrepant data, many of which consisted of wrong names or spelling mistakes,
empty data fields, unintelligible abbreviations and wrong information of destination
(Bailey, 2005).

As the shipping industry are worried about the risks brought by AIS

and “waiting for” the AIS-assisted accidents (Nautical Institute, 2003 and Belcher,
2004), the first collision between the Hyundai Dominion and the Sky Hope, mainly
caused by misunderstanding of AIS messages, occurred in the East China Sea on
June 21, 2004 (Speares, September1, 2005).
The improper use of AIS and the AIS-assisted accident have clearly presented the
fact that human elements involved, to which less attention was paid at the beginning,
are decisive to the development of AIS.
1

See Appendix One
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Human elements including ergonomic

designing, machine/human interface, mental stress, increased/reduced workload,
various human errors, etc. should be substantially addressed to reduce negative
effects of AIS and to realize as much potential as possible.
Furthermore, this study is aimed to help prepare for the implementation of the
compulsory installation of AIS before the deadline prescribed in SOLAS Convention.
From 30th April 2006 on, AIS equipments have to be installed on domestic-route
ships with 500 GT or more in China2.

Hopefully, this dissertation will offer some

guidance for shipping companies, classification societies and the Administration in
China.
1.2 Objective of the Study
-To identify human elements concerned in the usage and application of AIS;
-To examine and evaluate the impacts of those human elements on the
effectiveness of AIS;
-To explain why those human elements are related and how they impact the
effectiveness of AIS; and
-To give recommendations to minimize negative affects through incorporating the
consideration of human elements in the application of AIS.
1.3 Order of Presentation
The order of presentation is arranged in a logical sequence to focus and attain the
desired objectives of this dissertation.

In Chapter II, the basic functionalities as

well as potential benefits are briefly introduced to give readers a general idea about
AIS. Meanwhile, the need for the study on human elements in the implementation is
to be analyzed and explained.

Meanwhile, this chapter overviews the role of human

elements in the domain of maritime safety and also, defines human-related items in
the application of AIS.

Refer to the Document No. 406 issued on Oct.14, 2005 by China Maritime Safety
Administration
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Chapter III firstly defines “ergonomics” as the study and design of working
environments and their components, work practices, and work procedures for the
benefit of worker’s productivities, health, comfort and safety.

Proper ergonomics

generally promises higher productivity, more comfort and less risk.

To obtain an

objective comment on AIS ergonomics, this chapter overviews and evaluates the
effectiveness of current AIS ergonomic design. After that, Chapter III focuses on
the current AIS interface—MKD. Beginning with introduction of definition and
components of human/machine interface, the author, based on a practical survey,
evaluates how reasonable and effective the MKD is.

Having discussed the

significance of AIS-related ergonomics and interface and identified the existing
obstacles, the author raises recommendations for the development and evolution.
Chapter IV begins with the discussion of impacts derived from new technology,
implying the effects of AIS as a new technology should be fully considered.
Bearing in mind the two sides of new technology, the author look at the initial
expectations of reducing bridge workload through the implementation of AIS and
discuss the question whether the AIS DOES reduce seafarer’s workload or NOT.
Workload reduced by AIS includes reduction of VHF communications, avoiding
blind verbal communication, assisting the situational awareness and releasing stress.
At the same time, seafarers are suffering from altered patterns of workload, such as
interpretation and correlation of information and various stresses. In this chapter,
reasons for the increased workload are overviewed and analyzed. Some
recommendations are also raised to alleviate the workload induced during the usage.
Based on the basic types of human error, Chapter V tries to identify a variety of
human errors related to the usage of AIS, analyze the apparent and underlying
reasons, and discuss the measures to minimize the probability as well as the
consequence of those human errors.

Skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based

errors and violations involved in the operation of AIS are discussed.

In addition,

Chapter V analyzes the potential hazards brought by those human errors to
navigation safety.

Explanation is given why human errors may lead to failure to

4

make quick and precise decisions, confuse the vicinity ships and undermine the
effectiveness of AIS technology. In the last part of this Chapter, the author analyzes
the reasons for the occurrence of those human errors and presents some
recommendations.
Chapter VI concludes the whole paper and gives general suggestions for the
achievement of AIS full capabilities and future development.
1.4 Scope and Methodology
Visits to Wusong VTS and Yangshan VTS in the Port of Shanghai were made to
spot-check the current status of AIS usage. Statistics were also made there to get an
objective picture of the accuracy of AIS information sent from ships.

Interviews

were conducted not only to a few of VTS operators, but also to some PSC officers to
get sufficient first-hand information.

A panel of AIS technical experts were

contacted to obtain some advices and important technical materials that both greatly
contribute to the study. A literature search was extensively undertaken to examine
what findings have been got by current AIS trails and other research. IMO relevant
resolutions, AIS trail reports and AIS related papers, as well as some AIS-related
proposals submitted by IMO Party States during IMO Subcommittees’ meetings
were collected and examined to support the study.
The author also used his personal experience as a Port State Control officer to
conduct a survey3 to collect practical data from current seafarers.

During the

practical survey, the author boarded twenty container vessels and interviewed ten
duty officers to seek opinions and perspectives on AIS application. Questionnaire4
was designed and disseminated to facilitate the interview. The author also has got
an opportunity to view how AIS works on board. Detailed notes were made after
the interviewing in order to reflect the objective and complete facts.

These

experiences helped to identify main issues relevant to the objectives of the research.

3
4

For detailed information, refer to Appendix Two
See Appendix Three
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To get a comprehensive knowledge of human elements in maritime domain, the
author undertook an extensive research on human error, ergonomics, stress, workload,
human-machine interface, organizational management, etc. to facilitate the analysis
and support the recommendations.
The author also studied the report5 on AIS-assisted accident took place on June 21,
2004 in the East China Sea and incorporated the lessons into this dissertation.

5

Report on the investigation of the collision between Hyundai Dominion and Sky
Hope in the East China Sea on 21 June 2004, retrieved from the website of MAIB.
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Chapter Two

Overview of AIS and Human Elements Involved

2.1 General Introduction
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology, which has been under rapid
development for two decades, is driven by at least three forces.

Firstly, mariners

are seeking effective, reliable and automatic vessel identification to minimize the
verbal effort in calling blindly a vessel on VHF and to “reduce the hazard of making
collision avoidance arrangement with the wrong vessel” (T.R.B., 2003, p.15).
Secondly, this technology satisfies the needs of Governments to conduct effective
traffic management through more powerful VTS integrating AIS.

“Government

agencies of coastal states … are interested in vessel identification as well as
monitoring certain vessel activities and movements” (T.R.B., 2003, p.15). Last but
not least, the event of “9/11” is a catalyst for the acceleration of mandatory carriage.
2.1.1 Introduction of AIS
AIS is a shipboard broadcast data link system that acts like a transponder, operating
in marine VHF band.

It automatically provides or receives ship’s identification,

location and other data to/from other vessels and shore stations through the
Self-Organizing Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA) technology.

It can be

stated that in general, AIS provides a means of exchanging a precisely defined range
of data between ships, and between ships and shore facilities under the oversight of
competent authority (T.R.B., 2003, p18).
In an ideal case, vessels fitted with AIS broadcast their identifications, navigational
status and intentions to other AIS devices (mobile and shore-based) within the radio
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coverage of their own cell. Identifications including ship’s Maritime Mobile Service
Identity (MMSI), call sign and name, particulars including vessel type, dimension
reference for position, type of electronic position fixing device, as well as voyage
related information such as maximum present static draught, cargo type, destination
and ETA (estimated time of arrival) are broadcast every 6 minutes.

MMSI tagged

position reports including position accuracy (indicating whether DGNSS is used),
navigational status, course over ground (COG), speed over ground (SOG), true
heading (HDG), and rate of turn (ROT), are broadcast every 2-180 seconds,
depending on ship’s speed and rate of turn.
AIS is a new system that can be seen as the most important revolution in maritime
safety and security since Radar and GPS were introduced.

If full potential is

developed, AIS capabilities can be summarized as follows.
(1) Supplement the information from radar to provide officers of watch with
situational awareness (Pettersson, 2004), through
--Looking behind the bend in a channel or behind an island in an
archipelago, to detect the presence of other ships and identify them;
--Predicting the exact position of a meeting with other ships in a river
or in the archipelago to avoid meeting in e.g. a narrow river bend;
--Knowing which port and which harbor a ship is bound for;
--Getting aware of the size and the draft of ships in the vicinity;
--Detecting a change in a ship’s heading almost in real time; and
--Identifying a ferry leaving the shore bank in a river.
(2) Assist the coastal states to monitor ship’s movements and activities; and
(3) Facilitate Search and Rescue operation and provide methods to anti-pollution
from ships (Pettersson, 2004, Bao and Zhou, 2005).
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As a new technology with inadequate experience in usage, AIS inevitably has some
limitations and needs improvements, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
2.1.2 Carriage Requirements
Perceived as a promising technology of enhancing maritime safety, AIS equipment
was initially to be implemented as a mandatory carriage requirement under a planned
time schedule through which the gradual and phased introduction of this technology
were to be fully achieved by 2007. However, after the event of “9/11”, the focus of
attention changed and the system became more greatly valued in terms of its security
benefits.

As the consequence, the implementation date was brought forwards.

According to SOLAS Regulation 19, all ships of 300 GRT or upwards would have
been fitted with AIS by 1 July 2004 (IMO, 2004).
At present, all ships subject to the SOLAS Convention and of 300 gross tons (GT)
and upwards engaged on international voyages have been fitted with AIS.

Cargo

ships of 500 GT and upwards and passenger ships irrespective of size not engaged on
international voyages must fit AIS not later than July 1, 2008.
2.2 Need for Research on AIS-related Human Elements
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) argues AIS is a new and untried system,
with no accumulated operational experiences (Hinchliffe, 2002).

Meanwhile, the

schedule of mandatory carriage has been tremendously put forward due to the event
of “9/11”, leading to an embarrassing compromise between developing performance
and satisfying SOLAS requirements. “It was hijacked by the security agenda after
September 11 and has been too rapidly to be an effective tool for collision
avoidance” Andy Norris commented in a seminar held in Amsterdam in 2004
(Warner, March 26, 2004).
Undoubtedly, human operators are playing the pivotal role, either in current period or
in the coming stage for developing AIS technology.

Human elements are to be

identified for better use of this “untried” technology for the time being and more
significantly, to strengthen the base of evolution in the future.
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In simple, need for consideration of human elements is based on three reasons:
(1) Byproducts are emerging from the accelerated schedule;
(2) Inaccurate AIS-data and the existence of various human errors not only hamper
the full application of AIS, but also bring new risks to navigation safety; and
(3) Inherent limitations should be emphasized and recognized to achieve full
capabilities of AIS.
2.2.1 Byproducts Emerging from the Accelerated Schedule
2.2.1.1 Less Attention Paid to the Human Elements
Under the pressure of implementation schedule, neither the ship-owner nor the
manufacturer has sufficient time to produce a better AIS equipment by incorporating
human considerations in the design.

Less attention has been focused on the

effective use of AIS equipment, but on how the equipment can be installed as simple
and as soon as possible.

Bailey (2005, p.109) adds that whilst maritime authorities

have, in general, tended to focus on the technical issues of implementation and
equipment design, less attention appears to have been given to the issue of operator
training in the rush towards implementation.
2.2.1.2 Deviation from the Initial Purpose
The benefit of AIS system as originally conceived is its potential to contribute to
improved situational awareness for both those ashore (monitoring shipping) and for
those on the ship’s bridge concerned with collision avoidance.
The United States government, by contrast, has focused on the capacity for shore
side identification and tracking of ships and the potential for improved security
awareness. This transfer of focus, although diversifies its inherent functions and
develops more benefits, might inevitably undermine the initial purpose as an
assistant tool for situational awareness, and attract more attention to the
technological development which leads to less consideration of factors affecting
human performance.
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Therefore, for the purposes of safety and security achievements, AIS system needs to
be effectively operated through paying more attention on human elements which
influence considerably the full potential.
2.2.2 Inaccurate AIS-data and Human Errors
The navigation safety lies in good seamanship which describes the broad sense of
knowledge needed to navigate in a safe manner. Dodds (1995, p.1) believed that
modern seamanship requires an understanding of the natural world of ocean and sky,
and of the unnatural world of electronic and mechanical devices and it requires good
judgment and sound decision-making.
Assisting situation awareness, conceived as the main benefit of AIS, depends on the
reliable and accurate data transmitted and received.

However, the current status of

usage and implementation is far from initial expectation. In the spot check1 in August,
2005 at Shanghai VTS center, at least one third of ships with AIS equipments on
board were found displaying, more or less, incomplete and improper information.
Similarly, in the research undertaken at Dover channel in 2005, it was found that
from 84 vessels, there were 122 discrete items of discrepant data, many of which
consist of wrong names or spelling, empty data fields, unintelligible abbreviations
and wrong information of destination (Bailey, 2005). More interestingly, speaking
at the 17th International Maritime Pilots Association convention in Istanbul, Captain
Tuncay Cehreli, director-general of the new Vessel Traffic System, overseeing the
Turkish Straits estimated that some 80% of ships passing through the straits had
mistakes in the data that was electronically presented when the AIS was interrogated
by the VTS operators (Grey, July 1, 2004). In the observation in a Dutch VTS
station, Dr Norris found that 136 vessels from a total of 196 registered a speed of 0
knots. However, only 65 of the vessels had anchored or moored status (Warner,
March 26, 2004).
More seriously, human errors occurred in the usage of AIS are sometimes disastrous
for navigation safety.

The first AIS-assisted collision between the Hyundai

Dominion and the Sky Hope in the East China Sea on June 21, 2004 has highlighted

11

the danger of human errors when using AIS text facilities in situations requiring
prompt action.

The report by the UK's Marine Accident Investigation Branch

(MAIB) found that AIS text messaging for collision avoidance was “unsuitable” and
that time spent by the Hyundai Dominion's officer of the watch (OOW) sending the
text “was obviously time lost to him for taking more relevant action” (MAIB, 2005).
2.2.3 Inherent limitations of AIS
IMO Resolution A.917 (22) (IMO, 2002) has warned OOW of limitations at least as
follows:
--Not all ships are fitted with AIS and not all AIS equipments are switched on.
--Information received might be erroneous due to the shortfalls of the technology
and relevant sensors.
--Incorrect information might be transmitted and could be dangerously confusing.
Hinchliffe (2002) stated that the imminent arrival of AIS was not viewed with
unreserved joy by the mariner simply because it brought with it problems, for which
answers must urgently be found.
Considering the existence of inherent limitations, OOW is the only one who could
overcome those shortfalls and to visualize all the potential benefits of AIS technology,
using his/her competence (Pertterson, 2003). In this sense, the emphasis of human
elements seems to be essential.
2.3 Overview of Human Elements in the Domain of Maritime Safety
Historically, the international maritime community has approached maritime safety
from a predominantly technical perspective. Accordingly, safety standards have
primarily addressed ship design and equipment requirements.

Despite these

technical innovations, significant marine casualties and incidents have continued to
occur. After investigation and analysis, the maritime community is getting aware that
nearly 80% of maritime accidents are attributable to a variety of factors related to
human beings (Fotland, 2004).

In light of IMO resolution A.884 (21), human
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elements include design, manufacture, management, operations and maintenance
(IMO, 2000). In general, the following are examples of these factors in the domain
of maritime safety: culture, competence, communication, experience, fatigue, health,
situational awareness, stress and working conditions.
2.4 Human Elements to Be Highlighted
Introduction of new technology can be advantageous but sometimes it does not
properly consider human needs such as capabilities and limitations of operators
(Mokhtari, Moghadam, Brooks, Wall and Wang, 2005).

Lack of attention paid to

the operators at the centre of the safety-critical systems such as marine navigation
may create weak points in the whole system and reduce the effectiveness and
interactivity of new technology.

Despite the high diversity of operations in the

marine industry, there is less evidence of use of applied human factors research in
marine navigation than in aviation industry.

Unforeseen and unnecessary properties

in new technologies may hamper the OOW, especially in emergencies.
Human elements related to AIS span a particular range that includes ergonomics,
interface between machine and operators, additional workload and stress incurred
during the usage, various human errors resulting in negative effects, training and
certification issues, organizational management and so on.
Studying human element related to AIS is ought to improve the safety of marine
navigation.

Issues such as improper presentation of information may cause

misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and overload of information to the OOW.
Over-reliance on the systems, inadequate skills, and abilities of the OOW are also
matters that can amplify the danger to safety of marine navigation.

Effective

ergonomics, proper training and good equipment design can overcome the identified
difficulties. In the subsequent chapters, those specific issues will be discussed with
both theoretical principles and practical examples or experiences.
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Chapter Three

Ergonomics and Interface Relating to AIS

Poorly designed ergonomics and unfriendly AIS interface can be argued to impose
negative effects to the full capabilities of AIS. In the light of relevant research and
survey, OOW is suffering from the separated location of AIS equipment from radar
screen, and also from an unfriendly interface including complicated menus,
unnecessary data display, inconvenient operation, error-prone interpretation, etc. In
this chapter, ergonomics and interface relating to AIS in current status will be
discussed and in addition, some of shortfalls concerning AIS will be presented for
further consideration and debate.
3.1 Ergonomics relating to AIS
3.1.1 Definition and Role of Ergonomics
The terminology ergonomics refers to peculiar meaning in the maritime domain.
The IMO definition of ergonomics is the study and design of working environments
(e.g., workstations, cockpit, ship bridges) and their components, work practices, and
work procedures for the benefit of worker’s productivities, health, comfort and safety
(Squire, 2004).

It can be argued that the meaning of “human element” is similar

with that of “ergonomics”, and “…any distinctions are arbitrary and that, for all
practical purposes, the terms are synonymous” (Sanders and McCormick, 2002).
Proper ergonomics generally promises higher productivity, more comfort and less
risk, and on the contrary, if the ergonomics has got right, overall ship performance
might be compromised (Squire, 2004).

An expression of “ergonomic nightmare”

(Squire, 2004) is often heard emanating from mariners, reflecting their opinions on
the layout of ship’s bridge, or engine room.
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Human beings are generally inclined to

have implicit faith in those who have conceived, designed and built things and
seafarers are no exception.

However, ships will never be prefect due to the

compromise between what is needed to satisfy the regulations, what is absolutely
necessary to fulfill the operational role, and what is affordable.

Nevertheless, the

ergonomic design must be fit for purposes and enable the master and his/her crew to
fulfill their duties to ensure all safe operations on board. In other words, for any
ship or system to operate safely and effectively, it must be designed to support the
people who operate it, without detriment to their health, safety and overall
performance.
3.1.2 Overview and Evaluation of the Current Ergonomics Relating to AIS
Ergonomics relating to AIS mainly refers to the location of Minimum Keyboard
Display (MKD), if not integrated into other devices such as radar or Electronic
Nautical Chart (ENC) system.

Guidelines (IMO, 2003) for AIS installation suggest:

The functionality of the Minimum Keyboard and Display (MKD) should be
available to the mariner at the position from which the ship is normally
operated. This can be by means of the AIS’ internal MKD (integrated or
remote) or through the equivalent functionality on a separate display system.
To interpret this suggestion, we conclude that when using MKD units, sufficient
consideration should be given as to the placement of the display for effective use,
such as its proximity to radars and VHFs.
During the survey6 from twenty vessels, seven set MKD close to radar or ARPA, five
are installed in the chartroom, the rest eight are installed at the front edge of bridge
windows.

6

See Appendix Two
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Location of MKD
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Close Located

Chart Room

Bridge Window

Table One: Location of MKD

MKD
Figure One: MKD close to Radar

The separated installation makes the correlation between an AIS target and an ARPA
target tricky, particularly when the targets are close in range/bearing and where other
targets exist.

During the survey, all the interviewees believe the MKD and radar

screen should be closely located and one of the interviewee strongly complains that
the separated location makes AIS time-consuming and even useless when in heavy
traffic areas.

16

MKD

Figure Two:

MKD in the front of bridge

MKD

Figure Three:

MKD in the chartroom

In practice, the stand-alone display must find a place on the bridge and unfortunately,
this has the potential to increase the workload for the OOW on the bridge (Hinchliffe,
2002).

A dedicated display demands the undivided attention of the OOW for a

percentage of his time on watch. In busy traffic situations, where time is always at
a premium, there may be a need to scroll up and down the screen of the minimum
display to find the ship of interest. More significantly, the information AIS yields
will require mental correlation with radar information and visual observation.

Even

in good traffic conditions, the OOW will be required to maintain a very high degree
of spatial awareness to ensure that he/she understands which of his/her visual
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contacts is also held on radar or AIS or both.
During the interview with ten OOWs, the author found the different locations of
installation result in opposite reactions and opinions on the effectiveness and
usefulness of AIS.

Two interviewees serving on the ships where the MKD is

located in the chart room state that during the target-correlation, they have to write
down the range and bearing information from the radar, and then go to the chart
room to check MKD and ideally, to identify the proper ships.

They think it is

boring to do so, and feel frustrating if they identify the wrong ship. To avoid
mistaking the identification, they have to write down the bearing and range from the
radar, and then correlate them with AIS data. One Russia chief officer complains
that the target-correlation like this will cost too much time which is of great
importance in congested waters and it is unwise to install MKD in the chart room.
By contrast, two officers using MKD situated beside the radar screen think highly of
the usefulness of AIS.

They are accustomed to correlate AIS information with what

they observe with their eyes or radar.

They believe it is convenient to check AIS

data when they are keeping watch with radar, sitting in the chair in the middle of
radar screen and MKD.

One Chinese second officer argues that to some extent, this

kind of installation encourages him to use AIS more frequently.
Based on above discussions, it can be concluded that the ergonomics relating to AIS
mainly refers to the distance that MKD is located from the radar screen. The
willingness of OOWs to use AIS and the effectiveness of AIS application vary
greatly according to the remoteness of MKD.

OOWs are inclined to use AIS

installed close to radar more frequently than those who have to go back and forth
from the bridge to the chart room.

High probability of making mistakes and

consumption of more time are the contributable factors to the reluctance from OOWs,
which is quite opposite to the initial purpose of AIS technology.
3.2 AIS Interface
The efficiency and effectiveness of new equipment or technology greatly depend on
the interaction or interface with operators.
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Grabowski (2005) believes that

problems can arise from unanticipated interactions between technology, human
operators, and other systems in the environment.

How effective and productive the

AIS will be depends on whether the interface is user-friendly or not. As for the
significance of human/machine interface in shipping industry, IMO resolution
A.884(21) states that poor design of the ship, its subsystems, its environment controls,
engineering or its human-machine interfaces, which results in an increased difficulty
to perform shipboard tasks (IMO, 2000).

It is argued that for AIS to meet its stated

objective of promoting safe vessel navigation, an effective onboard interface with the
vessel’s operator is essential (T.R.B., 2003, p. 7)
In the last part of this chapter, the terminology of “interface” in AIS will be defined;
elements will be identified and evaluated; potential hazards or negative affects
brought by unfriendly interface will be discussed; and also, recommendations will be
given on the base of above analysis.
3.2.1 Definition of interface
From the perspective of the human operators, the “interface” of AIS can be defined
as “the display and control mechanisms that enable the exchange of information
between the person and the AIS” (TRB, 2003, p.105).
Displays are the means by which AIS data are converted into useful information for
the proper decision-making while controls are the ways through which OOWs could
input, or edit, or process the information subject to different needs.
3.2.2 Elements in AIS interface
The interface includes not only the display of information, such as cathode ray tube
graphics and auditory warnings, but also data entry and control elements, such as the
keyboard or switches.
AIS interface generally refers to what data will be presented, how they are displayed
and produced, how to control the display, how to consult and process the data, how
to input and edit the data, how the display affects the interpretation, so on and so
forth.

In short, all the interactions between the operator and AIS equipment can be
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generalized as elements on the interface.
3.2.3 IMO Guidelines Regarding AIS Interface
In IMO SN/Circ.227 (IMO, 2003a), the recommendation in terms of AIS display
system says:
If there is navigational equipment capable of processing and displaying AIS
information such as ECDIS, radar or an integrated system available on
board the ship, the AIS Class A mobile system may be connected to that
system via the AIS Presentation Interface (PI). …The display system can
also include the functionality of an MKD
Over the past years, a variety of technical, operational and installation standards have
been established and published by IMO, ITU and other organizations. However,
these standards do not particularly address how the information should be displayed
on board, excerpt for a minimum alphanumeric presentation.

Also, little has been

done to define the information needs and priorities that would establish display
parameters. The document submitted to IMO by the United Kingdom in 2003
states that “… other than at the most basic level, it has not yet been agreed how best
to display information. In itself, this might inform the decision as to the use to which
received information is put…” (IMO, 2003b).

They also present the question “to

what extent should it address the overlay/underlay/interlay situation?

Presently,

there is no requirement to display AIS information on radar or ECDIS but the
capability to do so exists” (IMO, 2003b).
3.2.4 Current AIS Interface
On the IMO/IALA seminar on AIS, the ICS (Hinchliffe, 2002) conveys their worries
concerning the AIS interface.
There is a risk that AIS evolution may well stall on the day that the last
carriage requirement becomes effective; as once AIS equipment is bought
and fitted, there is no incentive to buy an upgrade for many years.

The

accelerated introduction will arguably delay the introduction of integrated
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display systems and make it likely that the minimum display will be the
most common display system at sea for many years.
After conducting the practical survey and interview7, the author found almost the
same conclusion as ICS’s worries. From twenty ships actually boarded and a panel
of OOWs and Port State Control officers interviewed, the author has not seen or
heard any AIS integrated into radar or ENC or ECDIS system.
In short, the MKD represents the current status of AIS interface. It is estimated that
over 80% of owners are opting to fit the minimum requirement of an alpha numeric
unit similar in size (Nautical Institute, 2003), although AIS is now appearing on an
increasing number of vessels and there are many companies offering full integration
of AIS into ECDIS and radar displays.
3.2.5 Overview and Evaluation of MKD
Since the MKD dominates in the current status of AIS interface, it is meaningful to
insight this small box to get an objective picture of AIS interface.

The overview

and evaluation of the MKD is mainly based on the interview with ten OOWs and
also referred to findings from PSC officers.
From the perspective of operators on board, the MKD is generally considered unfit
for the AIS technology. All of the interviewees complain the MKD is too small in
size. They feel inconvenient to input, edit and check the data when necessary.

One

second officer confess that he suffers a lot from the MKD because the small screen
could not display all the targets he need. He has to scroll up and down to identify
the target ship several miles away since the targets are displayed according to their
distances.
One interviewee complains too many items are displayed on the small screen.
Three pages are needed to display all the items whereas some of them like call sign,
length, and width are not necessary.

He selects ship’s name, CPA, COG and

destination as four of the mot useful items.
7

See Appendix Two
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One chief officer does agree that there are too many sub-menus that need to shift for
reading messages or inputting data. As far as the design of menu is concerned, he
thinks it depends on different manufacturers. Take the MKD installed on his ship as
an example.

Three items including target’s course, distance and MMSI are

displayed on the first page. The chief complains a lot about this type of display and
describes it as “the worst thing” because it is extremely inconvenient and inefficient
to use ship’s MMSI as the identifier8.
Most of the interviewees criticize the keyboard which is described as “neither
convenient nor efficient” way. One chief officer recommends the input device should
be designed in the same way as a personal computer’s keyboard.
Some Port State Control officers who received interview reflected that over 60
percent of deficiencies related to AIS are operational problems.

Most deck officers

who are not familiar with the operation of data-input or displaying attribute the
reason to the complicated procedures and menus, or unfriendly displaying mode.
In short summary, as the interface, MKD has basic functionality to display the
targets’ information and enable OOWs to achieve necessary operations. However,
due to inherent deficiencies, MKD impose the following inconveniences to the
operators on board:
--The screen is too small in size and unable to display all the items, which results in
more time and efforts to search for data needed.
--Too many items (including static, dynamic and voyage-related information) are
displayed. Some of them can be omitted, or at least, debatable.
--The menus are complicated and confusing. Some functions like “undo” and “redo”
should be added.
--Considerable inconvenience is caused when correlating AIS data with radar
information because the course and speed given by AIS is “over-ground”.
According to Bailey (2005), ship’s name is the most effective identifier and around
86% ships manage to make VHF communications via calling names of each other.
8
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--The problem of inputting or editing data is noticeable. It costs time to input static
and voyage-related data.
Although AIS technology is generally acknowledged useful in assisting seafarers to
get situation awareness, the current interface should be considered responsible for the
universal complaining, workload and stress induced, and failure of implementation
of good seamanship in the collision between Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope.
Coupled with a user-friendly interface, the AIS information should allow OOWs “to
focus more time on the navigation situation around them thus increasing situational
awareness and safety” (Edwards and Pietraswski, 2000).
3.3 Approaches to Mitigate the Negative Effects from Ergonomics and Interface
3.3.1 Incorporating Ergonomic Consideration into the Designing Process
Since ships’ life span will probably last twenty years and more, it is important that
ergonomic efficiency is taken into account as new equipment is retrofitted.
Ergonomic considerations regarding AIS should never be neglected. The different
locations of MKD might become one of the critical factors affecting the potential
capabilities of AIS technology.

In addition, the ergonomic design would be better if

some room is left for the future integration into other equipments. Clearly, where
AIS information is fused with the radar picture, such continuous monitoring will be
relatively easy. In other cases, the MKD should be in close proximity to the radar
screen that is likely to be used in restricted visibility.
3.3.2 Integrating AIS with Other Equipments
Integrating AIS with other equipment in the bridge system is almost the consensus of
the whole shipping industry.

However, when AIS displays are integrated with other

equipments, the information must be presented to the OOWs in such a way that it is
clear, unambiguous, and accurate. Additional work is also required to determine
how to best integrate the existing and new systems, which will affect the entire
process of introducing AIS displays aboard vessels.

23

3.3.3 Reinforcing the Emphasis on Human-centered Interface
We should always bear in mind that advanced technology can increase errors and
risks even when appearing to be beneficial. In the context of AIS, the ways for
OOWs to input, edit and consult and methods for displaying should be defined and
evaluated sufficiently.

Although several researchers have investigated mariner

collision avoidance and navigation strategies and information needs, no one has
systematically evaluated how AIS can support these and other information needs
(Hutchins 1990; Laxar and Olsen 1978; Lee and Sanquist 1993; Lee and Sanquist
2000; Schuffel et al. 1989).

Therefore, when we are designing an effective

human-centered AIS interface, a systematic process should be required to consider
the capabilities of the users and the demands of the operational environment.
3.3.4 Putting More Focus on Designing
When establishing the cause of an accident, any approach focusing solely on the
personnel on board will reduce the possibility of identifying the underlying cause.
There must also be some focus on errors in design, poor ergonomics and technical
solutions, and routines and procedures incorrectly implemented.
Considering the designed purposes of AIS, more efforts should be put on
shore-to-ship data relating to traffic management.

At present, most of AIS reported

information has focused on target data in ship-to-ship use for identification or
collision avoidance.

This hampers the complete achievement of AIS benefits.

3.3.5 Paying More Attention to Trivial Considerations
Information displayed on the MKD, wherever possible, should be those considered
as most important to obtain situational awareness.

The information should be listed

in an appropriate order of visual priority. As Taylor argues (2003) that there is a
need to filter the data so that the mariner gets presented only with the essentials and
the “kiss” (keep it simple, stupid) principle is a good one to follow on ships’ bridges
as elsewhere in life.
Besides modification of displaying approaches, some items related to controlling
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means, although seem trivial, are actually playing significant roles in the process of
usage. OOWs are discouraged, to some extent, to use this equipment if the screen is
small, the menu appears complicated and keyboarding remains time-consuming.
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Chapter Four Workload Reduced and Induced by AIS
4.1 Impact of New Technology
Undoubtedly, new technology is often introduced in systems as way of reducing
workload and improving human performance in the system.

Technology can be

designed in an attempt to remove the source of error and improve system
performance, often by automating functions carried by a human operator (Grabowski,
2004).

It is often assumed that technology will simplify the operator’s job and

reduce the errors and costs (Wickens et al. 1997, p. 265).
Problems can arise not only because of the technology itself but also because of the
way the technology is implemented in practice. Technology can also introduce new
human error forms (Wiener, 1988), and “automation surprises” can puzzle the
operator (Sarter and Woods, 1995). These effects can reduce system efficiency or
compromise safety, negating the other benefits that technology provides. One of
the ironies of technology is that automation designed to reduce operator workload
sometimes increases it (Bainbridge, 1983 and Rochlin, 1997).

In addition, the

introduction of technology can lead to manual skill deterioration, alteration of
workload patterns, poor monitoring, inappropriate responses to alarms, and
reductions in job satisfaction, (Wiener and Curry, 1980).
The introduction of AIS technology is no exception.

Moore (2002) states that the

AIS’s overall benefits to the mariner will provide him/her timely and accurate
information, in a form immediately applicable to decision-making, and in a manner
that minimizes the bridge workload.

By contrast, Ramsvik (2004) believed that too

much of the OOW’s time would be required to interpret and assimilate AIS target
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information presented on MKD and then associate it with visually observed targets
and with ARPA target information presented on other screens.
Bearing in mind the two sides of the introduction of new technology, we look at the
initial expectations of reducing bridge workload through the implementation of AIS
and discuss the question whether the AIS could reduce OOWs’ workload or not.
4.2 Workload Reduced by AIS
4.2.1 Reduction of VHF Communications
One of the designed benefits of AIS is path prediction.

The large potential of

transmitting the rate of turn of the ship, together with all the other movement
parameters including ETA, destination, draught and etc. enables both the VTS and
approaching ships to make a rather accurate prediction of the path a ship is taking,
some 30-90 seconds ahead (Petterson, 2003). This gives more time and better
information for all the other navigators in the traffic environment to plan their
moves.
The functionality of path prediction facilitates the reduction of VHF communications.
Stitt (2004) argues that AIS should provide sufficient additional information to
determine whether a risk of collision exists without the problems of different
languages, accents and cultures that are inherent in any VHF communications.
VHF Channel 16 communications, especially within congested waters, not only
intervene OOW’s normal operations, but also distract his/her attention from keeping
proper watch-out.

Those unnecessary conversations which can be eliminated by

proper use of AIS bring additional workload as well as mental stress to the bridge
personnel.

Ramsvik (2004) adds that Bridge Teams feel that it is desirable to

minimize VHF traffic because it reduces the number of things the OOW has to focus
on.

Thus, an AIS-equipped ship should not be required to report its particulars,

nature of its cargo, destination, position, etc. because AIS was designed to do this
without Bridge Team involvement.
Therefore, if proper use is made of AIS information, it is arguable that the prediction
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of target’s path may be achieved and pass arrangements may be made in silence.
Since fewer VHF conversations are needed, the time involved in making a call would
often be better spent in considering what action is required by the Rules, taking that
action and then monitoring the position.
Nevertheless, although the potential reduction in VHF communications following the
implementation of the AIS carriage requirements is welcome among navigators and
shore VTS operators, the means of the information displayed is equally concerned.
It is suggested that the information displayed should be only that which is necessary
for the safe and effective operation in anti-collision mode (Tailor, 2002).
4.2.2 Avoiding Blind Verbal Communications
The fundamental function of AIS is to achieve the target’s identification. Ambiguous
calls, with a stressed voice at night, described as: “Ship on my starboard side, Ship
on my starboard side, this is M/S XXX, I am turning to port” have made many
OOW’s wishing for an AIS to identify the called target and to get the information
about when and how much M/S XXX is turning and to whom she is directing her call
(Petterson, 2003).
This blind calling is particularly frustrating and tiring when proceeding in waters
with complicated situations.

In addition, to avoid the occurrence of urgent situation

when the communication becomes essential, the OOW has to identify the target with
alternative ways such as marking it with accurate GPS positions or with specific
bearing and range away from some known lighthouse, and then try to call the target
with diversified ways.

This process significantly burdens the OOW with workload

as well as fatigue. It can be imagined that if all the passing arrangements are made in
the way discussed above, the workload will be tremendous and dangerous.
With the identification of target, both the effort of marking the target with onerous
approaches and the verbal repeat of calling can be minimized and accordingly, the
workload brought to the OOW is alleviated.

A similar result from the survey

undertaken among numerous Masters and Mates is that AIS significantly reduces
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workload in the effort of physical reporting (Grabowski, 2004).
4.2.3 Assisting the Situational Awareness
According to IMO Resolution A.917 (22), AIS is intended to provide additional
information to assist situational awareness (IMO, 2002).
“Situation awareness” has been used in the Aviation Industry for some time to
describe the top-level requirement of the instrument navigational aids to the user.
The definition most commonly used is that given by Endsley (1995): “Situation
awareness” is the perception of the elements of the environment within a volume of
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their
status in the near future.
The elements of the navigational environment may embrace:
(1) Natural elements, like tide, wind, current and etc.;
(2) Conditions of the waterways, including the Aids to Navigation, depth, width of
the channel or waters; and
(3) Movement or intended movement of the target.
The first two elements are beyond the functionality of AIS while the third one is
what AIS focuses on. Without the help of AIS, the OOW might seek information
either from radar or his/her visual observation. However, it is recognized that radar
has its inherent limitations and blind sectors which can be supplemented by AIS
technology (Berking, 2003).

The visual observation would be ineffective when the

visibility is poor in foggy weather. Thus, situational awareness brought by AIS
greatly facilitates OOWs to get aware of the elements of navigational environment in
case the radar or visual observation offers little help.

Stitt (2004) argues that where

the AIS information is integrated with ARPA or ECDIS displays, there is
undoubtedly and improvement in situation awareness.
4.2.4 Releasing Stress
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Mental stress is one of the contributors to fatigue which is the underlying cause of
marine casualties.

More stress will be generated when an OOW is put under more

workload caused by unknown situation. As Petterson (2003) states:
All the OOWs, within the radio range, will be put under severe stress due to
this inaccurate and incomplete information.

The stress will last the APAR

radar equipped ships, after two or three minutes, will direct that one of the
targets on the display is turning and might be M/S XXX.
During the interview with OOWs, some interviewees believe AIS makes them feel
more relaxed and confident when making pass arrangements, especially after
identifying the right target.
In short, the stress induced by additional workload and unclear situation is argued to
decrease through the usage of AIS. However, other types of mental stress might be
generated from a variety of resources, which will be further discussed in 4.3. 3.2.
4.3 Workload Induced by AIS
Before discussing the workload induced by AIS, mariners should be reminded of the
impacts of automation.

If impacts of automation from positive as well as negative

aspects have been considered, the reasons and sources for workload induced by AIS
will become understandable.
4.3.1 Impacts of Automation
Automation is often introduced with the goal of reducing operator workload.
However, automation sometimes has the effect of reducing workload during already
low-workload periods and increasing it during high-workload periods. In this way,
clumsy automation can make easy tasks easier and hard tasks harder.

For example,

a flight management system tends to make the low-workload phases of flight (such
as straight and level flight or a routine climb) easier, but it tends to make
high-workload phases (such as maneuvers in preparation for landing) more difficult;
pilots have to share their time between landing procedures, communication, and
programming the flight management system (Cook et al. 1990b; Woods et al. 1991).
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In marine navigation, bridge automation can reduce operator workload during some
voyage phases, but can increase workload in other phases of the voyage, perhaps
during arrival or departure, particularly if the operator is unfamiliar with the
technology (Grabowski and Sanborn, 2001). As a result, the anticipated workload
reduction of the automation may not be realized.
AIS is a typical new technology with functionalities of automation and “may be
prone to the same problems of clumsy automation, particularly if there is a high level
of text messages during the already high-workload periods associated with transiting
restricted waters or coming into a port” (T.R.B., 2003, p.122).
Therefore, due to the existence of negative effects of automation, the workload
induced by AIS should be never ignored.
4.3.2 Reasons for New Patterns of Workload Induced
Safe navigation is achieved through the clear identification of the tasks required of
the OOWs and the effective and efficient use of all available tools to fulfill such
tasks.

Woods (2002) believes that today’s watchkeeper is required to absorb and

process a considerable amount of information and data to achieve the desired result
of the overall safe navigation of the vessel, and the retrieval of information can be
time-consuming because of the large number of stand-alone instrument displays,
which in some cases, are distributed in an illogical and irrational manner.
Troubles can also stem from unanticipated interactions among new technology,
human operators, and other systems in the environment.

These can be problems

inherent to the technology, as well as to the technology’s behavior in a larger, more
complex system, Tenner (1996). This can be seen in integrated ship’s bridge systems,
where system performance can be determined by the interaction of multiple sensors,
systems, people, and technologies (Grabowski and Roberts, 1996; Grabowski and
Sanborn, 2001).
As Stitt (2004) states, one of the similarities between the introduction of AIS and the
period when radar, and the later ARPA, were first widely used is that new
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technology is involved and the related equipment is being brought into use with only
limited experience of the practical effects of that technology.
To summarize, reasons for new patterns of workload induced by AIS embrace three
aspects, namely, correlation information between AIS and other equipments,
interaction among technology, human operators and other systems, and limited
practical experience.
4.3.3 Types of Workload Induced
4.3.3.1 Correlating Information between AIS and Other Equipments
In practice, over 80% of MKD is a stand-alone display which is set either on the
bridge or even worse, in the chart room (Nautical Institute, 2003). A dedicated
display demands an undivided attention of the OOW for a percentage of his time on
watch.

In busy traffic areas where time is always limited, the OOW always has to

page up and down to find the ship of interest.
Despite these efforts and assuming the identification of target is smoothly done, the
work of OOW is far from over.

Navigational data AIS yields will require mental

correlation with radar information and visual observation. Even in good conditions,
the OOW will be required to maintain a very high degree of spatial awareness to
ensure that he/she understands which of his/her visual contacts is also held on radar
or AIS or both. In conditions of poor visibility the problem is compounded and
there is a chance of human error, when the OOW cannot be sure that all contacts will
be detected by radar or by AIS.

In addition, due to the master’s discretion to switch

off the AIS if he/she perceives the status is beneficial to the security and the fact that
not all the ships are equipped with AIS, the OOW can never be completely ensured
that the ship of interest is the target displayed on the MKD.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that some displays are effectively
ground stabilized through reliance on GPS whilst others present a relative picture.
It seems inevitable that there will be an irresistible temptation to use VHF in an
attempt to resolve traffic situations simply because AIS will provide the identity of
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some of the ships involved.

The possibility for confusion can be more readily

understood when it is appreciated that not all ships will be fitted with AIS or not all
switch on the AIS.
In short summary, generated from interpreting and correlating information between
AIS and other equipments such as radar or ENC or ECDIS, this pattern of workload
is the biggest one among the induced. Lee (2001) stated similarly:
The information provided by navigational aids on the bridge of a typical ship
is currently distributed over a number of ‘stand-alone aids’…Distributing the
information is not in itself bad design.

But too often the task requires

multiple instrument viewing and holistic comprehension by the mariner of
multiple information sources.

The difficulties are compounded by there

being, currently, no consistency in the manner of operation or of symbology
between the various display surfaces.
4.3.3.2 Types of Mental Stress Induced
Mental stress alleviated AIS through enhancing situational awareness has been
discussed in 4.2.4.

Nevertheless, other types of mental stress may be generated

mainly due to the unfamiliarity with the operation as well as interpretation.
The “unfamiliarity” generally consists of unfamiliarity with AIS menu operation,
incomprehension of AIS information, uncertainty with the correlated information and
interrupting alarms from MKD.
Stress from menu-operation is the stress originated from the complicated and poorly
designed AIS menu.

This kind of stress is low-level because it can be eliminated by

better designing or more practicing. Usually, younger OOWs have a culture of
using information technology and the elder seafarers seem more likely to upset when
using menus to input, edit or consult AIS information.
Stress from incomprehension is the primary one in AIS usage. Assuming all AIS
information transmitted and received is correct, the OOW needs to know how best to
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utilize those information.

To do so, it requires a basic understanding of AIS system

and the basis of the information presented.

If the OOW is not competent enough,

he/she might be unable to understand AIS information well and, say nothing of
correlating them with those on radar.

Hinchliffe (2002) states that the appreciation

of the complexities associated with ground stabilized and sea stabilized displays and
the effect on true vectors makes it doubtful how those OOWs with insufficient
knowledge will cope with AIS.

Moreover, in case the navigation situation becomes

complicated and the use of AIS seems necessary, the stress from incomprehension
will be tremendously increased.
Stress from uncertainty is generally derived from tricky situation where the OOW is
not certain whether the ship of interest is the one he/she identifies on the MKD.
When the careful OOW bears in mind the fact that not all ships are equipped with
AIS and not all AISs are switched on, he/she may suffer the mental stress from
uncertainty. This kind of stress is likely to be magnified if the uncertainty lasts for
quite a long period.
Stress due to alarms arises when OOW feels overloaded or doubtful with AIS.
Alarms added to this equipment could also be source of mental stress. In terms of the
alarm-related stress, Tailor (2003) stated: “I have on many occasions witnessed the
frustration of a master in the middle of the night, seeking to track down the source
and level of importance of one or more alarms…” and “I have listened and watched
the levels of stress rise to unreasonable levels as one or more of the officers on a
bridge wrestled with a set of controls which performed a subtly different function…”
Thus the stress, although released a little bit during the course of getting situation
awareness, might be generated for a variety of reasons and should not be overlooked.
Too much mental stress raised may cause reluctance to use, occurrence of human
errors and reduction of self-confidence in maritime navigation.

All of these are

opposite to the initiatives of AIS development.
4.4 Approaches to Reduce Workload and Stress as a Whole through AIS
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Embracing both promises and shortfalls, every new technology imposes considerable
impacts on the users.

If properly developed, technology will be definitely

beneficial while on the contrast, it may also become catastrophic.
As a new and untried technology, AIS introduces new pictures on bridge automation
which is conceived crucial to the reduction of OOW’s workload and stress. The
workload and stress reduced through the application of AIS is obvious because of the
designed function.

However, other patterns of workload and stress derived from the

same equipment should never be ignored.
Thus, the question whether AIS, as a whole, truly reduces human workload and
stress or not becomes somehow complicated. The ultimate answer varies case by
case, person by person and, situation by situation.

The only issue can be definitely

right is to amplify the benefits of AIS and to mitigate various workload and stress
induced by AIS.
In summary, approaches to reduce workload and stress as a whole though AIS should
include the followings:
--Fully appreciate the impacts of new technology, and exert potential benefits while
avoiding clumsy development.
--Get familiar with the path prediction by use of AIS information and shrink VHF
communications.
--In case verbal communication is necessary, avoid blind verbal calling and mistaken
targeting through accurate identification of the ship of interest.
--The selection of the presented information should be filtered by the ‘need to know
principle’ to enable the user to reduce cognitive workload.
--Get accustomed to the correlation between AIS and other navigational aids.
Situational awareness can not be ensured unless information available is correctly
interpreted.
--Before substantial improvement on MKD is achieved, training and practicing
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should be encouraged to promote OOWs’ skills and competence in the usage of AIS.
All the types of stress induced by AIS can tremendously decrease with improvement
of OOWs’ competence.
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Chapter Five

AIS-related Human Errors

It is commonly agreed among the shipping industry that approximate 80% of marine
accidents are rooted in human error (Fotland, 2004).

The trend also indicates that

there are fewer accidents caused by technical failure of a piece of equipment, and an
increasing number that can be explained by human errors. The problem is complex;
human error may very well be due to an error in design, improper follow-up of the
building process, or lack of proper routines on board. Some studies also indicate that
a majority of the accidents due to human error may be traced back to factors where
the ship’s management has a strong influence, and in some cases direct control.
If we recall the situation when radar and ARPA were first introduced, marine
accidents happened occasionally due to various human errors and Wei (2004)
suggests that the lessons learned the hard way when radar and ARPA were first used
should not be forgotten.
As the whole shipping industry were waiting for the first “AIS-assisted” maritime
accident, it did happen in the East China Sea on June 21, 2004 (Lloyds List,
September 1, 2005,) and unsurprisingly, it is subject to a typical human error (MAIB,
2005).
Based on the application of three basic error types, this chapter tries to identify a
variety of human errors related to the AIS usage, analyze the apparent and underlying
reasons, and to discuss the measures of minimizing the probability as well as the
consequence of those human errors.
5.1 Basic Errors Types
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Senders and Moray (1991, p.21) defines the human error as a human action that fails
to meet an implicit or explicit standard. They add that an error occurs when a
planned series of actions fails to achieve its desired outcome, and when this failure
cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance occurrence (1991, p.21).
Rasmussen divided human error into three basic error types, namely: skill-based slips
(and lapse), rule-based mistakes and knowledge-based mistakes (Reason, 1990, p.53).
According to UK P&I CLUB (2003), unintended errors stem from informational
factors and the likelihood is reduced by improving information.

In addition to three

basic error types, violation is a unique type of error that reflects intentional purposes.
In short, sources of human error can be summarized as the followings (UK P&I
CLUB, 2003)
Skill-based Human Errors
Skill-based human errors consist of:
(1) memory failures, referring to omission or repetition of planned or
intended action; and
(2) attentional failures, referring to unintended deviation from a correct
plan of action.
Memory failures are subject to change in nature of task or change in task
environment whereas attentional failures are contributable to distraction
from task or preoccupation with other things.

Routine and highly

practiced tasks are carried out at the skill-based level, in a largely
automatic fashion.
Rule-based Human Errors
Rule-based human errors are those intended action inappropriate to
circumstances or sound rules applied in inappropriate circumstances.
When there is a need to modify our largely pre-programmed behavior in
line with some change in the situation, we should switch to the rule-based
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level. It is called rule-based because we apply stored rules of the kind:
if (this situation) then do (these actions).
Knowledge-based Human Error
Knowledge-based human error refers to erroneous judgment in situation
not

covered

by

rule

experience-immaturity.

because

of

insufficient

knowledge

or

Given time, human beings are often able to

produce good solutions but, in an emergency, are not.

Only when we

have repeatedly failed to find a solution using known methods, do we
resort to the slow, effortful and highly error-prone business of thinking
things through on the spot usually at their best.
Violations
Besides three types of unintended errors, violation is considered as an
intended error which stems mainly from motivational factors and is
reduced by changing attitudes or culture.
There are five types of violation
(1) Routine violations, the Habitual deviation from required practice;
(2) Optimizations violations, involving thrill seeking while getting from
A to B, or indulging in aggressive instincts;
(3) Situational violations, referring to problems that are not specifically
covered in the procedures;
(4) Exceptional violations, Ad hoc infringement of regulated practice in
unforeseen or undefined situations; and
(5) Acts of sabotage, deliberate violation for malicious reasons.
5.2 Human Errors related to AIS
Detection of target by AIS totally depends upon the full cooperation of the target
vessels within detection range.

Human errors occurring in the routine operation
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definitely reduce the reliability of AIS information, limit its usefulness and
effectiveness for collision avoidance, and ultimately, put the ship into a substantial
danger.

Issues such as improper presentation of information may cause

misunderstanding, misinterpretation, and overload of information to the OOW
(Bailey, 2005).

AIS problems will be more noticeable and potentially dangerous in

areas of restricted visibility and radar blind areas and they might cause AIS assisted
collisions or incidents. Over-reliance on the systems, increase in mental stress in
busy traffic areas, inadequate skills and abilities of OOWs are also issues that can
amplify the risk to the navigational safety.
Studying AIS-related human errors may help to identify and eliminate the errors
which often occur and impose potential or apparent hazards to marine navigation.
Identifying those errors makes navigators more aware of the inherent limitations of
AIS technology and current design, and more cautious about AIS routine operation.
To achieve this goal, we will concentrate more on the various human errors found in
the operation than in the designing course.
5.2.1 Skill-based Errors
Skill-based errors related to AIS operations are relatively simple. They can be easily
prevented through effective bridge procedure and more practicing.

Basically, there

are three types of skill-based error in the routine usage of AIS.
The error stemming from memory failures or attention failures is the primary one.
In Bailey’s research (2005), two major categories of error are related to ship’s
draught and destination, which are included in the scope of voyage related data and
should be updated each voyage.

This founding reflects the phenomenon that OOWs

often fail to update the information of new voyage and remain the data of previous
trip, or even that of long time before.
Another common error is connected with the transmission of navigation status.
Since it is optional and that it will usually rely on manual input, OOWs often find
ships under sail presents the status under “moored” (Warner, March 26, 2004). Stitt
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(2004) argues that especially in emergencies, making a change in the status could be
overlooked.
The third typical type of skill-based error is misspelling.

Bailey (2005) finds, in his

research that it is surprising that there are any instances of error relating to call sign,
name and MMSI number as these are initially entered when the system is installed.
Due to the limitation of input device, OOWs are probable to make spelling mistakes
during the data-input if some distractions appear and result in attentional failures.
5.2.2 Rule-based Errors
Although some operational guidelines have been provided by IMO Resolution A.917
(22) (IMO, 2002) for OOWs to effectively apply AIS technology, rule-based errors
still prevails in four aspects.
Firstly, the unintelligible abbreviations regarding “destinations” bring a lot of
confuse to OOWs.

This situation leads to confusion and inefficiency in data

interchange (IMO, 2003). Although it is recommended that OOWs enter the ship’s
destination into the AIS at the start of each voyage, and to keep this information
updated (IMO, 2002), there is no clear provisions or standards in terms of the
abbreviation of destinations. Therefore, “evidence shows that mariners are using
different names for the same location when entering destination data in their AIS
units” (IMO, 2003). It may be confusing and misleading when OOWs use the
destination data to predict the possible route of the targets.
The Master’s discretion of switching off the AIS equipment is the second big
problem related to rule-based errors.

The operation of AIS is governed by

international legislation allowing the Master to switch the AIS ON and OFF at the
Master’s discretion. In light of the statistics by Auxiliary (2004), 47% masters
consider switching off their AIS off, and 19% definitely switch it off when passing
through a known piracy area. Auxiliary (2004) also draws the conclusion from his
research that there remains significant misunderstanding with respect to the authority
of the Master and its use.

All these are indicative of the shortage of unambiguous
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rules regarding the conditions under which AIS is allowed or not allowed to be
switched off.
The third typical rule-based error concerns with the receiving/transmitting safety
related information.

There are no internationally accepted standards for messages

describing safety-related or environmental conditions. It is problematic for OOWs,
especially for non-English speakers to edit and interpret information quickly and
precisely without sacrificing proper watch-out. The first AIS-assisted accident, the
collision between Hyundai Dominion and Sky Hope, is caused by lack of necessary
communication which was considered by one of the watchkeepers, had been replaced
by the exchange of a text message (MAIB, 2005).
Finally, examples from the ‘other’ category include: the inappropriate addition of
comments such as ‘not under command’ in the ship type field, and the transmission
of a ‘Mayday’ message via the text facility when there was no distress.
5.2.3 Knowledge-based Errors
Currently, what the shipping industry concern is whether OOWs are changing
information and, if so, to what extent they are knowledgeable about what they are
doing.

The technical specification for AIS is well documented whereas the

knowledge required by the operator is not (IMO, 2003).
The most probable knowledge-based error may be found in the interpretation of AIS
information. Ramsvik states (2004):
That is a main part of the problem; most navigators are today not familiar
with the AIS technology and its pros and cons partly mentioned above, and
may use the AIS information uncritically and trust the AIS information in
disfavor of the ARPA/ Radar information.
The probability of knowledge-based error is extremely high when the OOW is not so
knowledgeable with the correlation with the radar target. This problem is further
complicated by the fact that some displays are effectively ground stabilized through
reliance on GPS whilst others present a relative picture. Thus, the OOW is ought to
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remember to alter the displaying mode to make the information consistency.

In

some cases where the alteration is not convenient, he/she has to bother to calculate
the alteration manually.

All these operations need relevant knowledge.

If AIS is integrated into ARPA, the OOW should also be reminded that he/she may
experience two information sources with different data for the same target vessel.
In this aspect, Ramsvik (2004) conveys his worries:
We may also foresee situations where the position of the AIS target and the
ARPA target for the same vessel are different due to position error from the
AIS…. The navigator may then perceive the situation as there are two vessels
and react wrong if he/she should do in the actual situation.
Therefore, OOWs who read AIS information should never forget the limitations of
this technology.

They ought to bear into mind the fact that the information

presented might be erroneously input. The knowledge of the pitfalls, the awareness
of the possibility of conflicting and confusing information, either imposed on the
radar or independently displayed, will absolutely benefit the prevention of potential
for disastrous consequences.
5.2.4 Violations
Violations here refer to failing to comply with good seamanship and generally
embrace three types:
The first violation is to break COLREGs.

Evidences show some OOWs are more

likely to violate COLREGs due to the introduction of AIS. It is reported that the
primary use of AIS by some OOWs is to identify other vessels and contacting them
by VHF either to confirm or contravene the COLREGs (Nautical Institute, 2003).
Similarly, Petterson (2004) states that It has been argued that OOWs, on board
equipped ships, sometimes will actively agree on actions in conflict with COLREG,
due to their knowledge about names of other ships.
The second category of violation is to misuse AIS information. Availability of
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information notwithstanding, IMO acknowledges that AIS information will be
available for the coast safety agencies and authorities and could equally be available
for ill-minded people. AIS itself is a tool used in an information collection system
and we can not prevent people from misusing that information.

As Ramsvik (2004)

suggests that we may also note that it’s possible to set up a “ghost AIS” sending false
data.
The last kind of violation is somewhat of controversy. Is the OOW violating his/her
good bridge practice when he/she inputs text message for collision avoidance when
visual observation is argued to be more useful? Nautical Institute (2003) states that
as the overwhelming majority of OOWs have not received any information or
training in their use and the sending of text messages to other ships will contravene
good bridge practice.
5.3 Potential Hazards
AIS is intended to assist OOWs to get situation awareness and it can be easily
understood that potential hazards will be caused by various human errors during the
operation. If summarized, the hazards to navigational safety can be elaborated as
the followings:
5.3.1 Failing to Make Quick and Precise Decisions
AIS enables OOWs to make decisions in line with the data provided by other sources.
In other words, OOWs may make decisions or predictions with reference to the AIS
information.

Thus, Bailey (2004) states where the information displayed is

incorrect there is clear scope for an officer to make a poor decision on the basis of
what is presented.

In addition, transmitting incorrect data brings into question the

levels of confidence that can be placed in the information received by both those
ashore and those on board ship.
For those who do not appreciate the necessary knowledge of proper use of AIS
technology, this hazard might be amplified.
decision-making more easily.
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Wrong interpretation leads to wrong

The consequence of violating COLREGs can be considerable.

Where ships start

negotiating actions contrary to COLREGs it becomes increasingly difficult for
surrounding ships to plan ahead.

The effect of such action is to undermine

situational awareness rather than improve it as intended. These findings highlight a
range of issues pertinent to the use of AIS in the context of decision making and
collision avoidance.
5.3.2 Confusing the Vicinity Ships
Human errors, especially skill-based errors might cause very confusing and
embarrassing situation.

For instance, wrong installation type data, such as an

incorrectly spelled ‘name’ may cause confusion should a vessel need to contact
another.

Erroneous voyage data such as ‘destination’ could lead a vessel wrongly

to anticipate a maneuver by another in close proximity, say one being overtaken or
running alongside, while the appearance of incorrect navigational data, such as
course or speed vector introduces a serious risk into the decision making frame.
When OOWs are confused, they usually seek confirmation with an alternative
approach, which makes time more limited in congested waters.
5.3.3 Undermining the Effectiveness of AIS technology
Each of these instances of erroneous data undermines the confidence that can be
placed in the AIS system and hence its contribution to improved situational
awareness. Neither mistrust nor over-trust is beneficial to the effective use of AIS.
Insofar as access to a vessel’s name makes it easier to use VHF to establish contact
with other vessels, there is an increased risk that VHF traffic and, specifically,
negotiation of collision avoidance will be promoted.

Ironically, the original

intention of AIS is to reduce VHF verbal communication which is believed to add
more workload and misunderstandings to OOWs.
5.4 Reasons for the Occurrence of Human Error
5.4.1 Lack of Training Programs

45

It is probable that, initially, many of the shortcomings of AIS will not be properly
appreciated. Stitt (2004) states that in many cases, OOWs will not be properly
trained in the use of AIS and its potential benefits and shortcomings.

Moreover,

because of the accelerated timetable and increased emphasis on anti-terrorist and
ship-to-shore applications, there is a danger that the operational requirements of AIS
applications will form a substantial part of the syllabus, to the detriment of training in
the effective use for collision avoidance.
5.4.2 Unawareness of the Limitations
Knowledge-based human errors mainly result from unawareness of AIS limitations.
In the information technology age, OOWs tend to put more faith in electronic aids
than is really warranted. They are likely to neglect the fact that AIS will provide yet
another distraction, and it could become a further excuse for reduced attention for
keeping a proper visual lookout. Stitt (2004) argues AIS generated information,
whether on stand-alone displays or shown on ARPA or ECDIS displays is also likely
to divert attention away from CPAs and TCPAs derived form one’s own ship’s
radar/ARPA if only because of its novelty value.
5.4.3 Insufficient Bridge Procedures
It should be recognized that many AIS-related human errors can be avoided if anti
measures are made and incorporated in bridge procedures.

For instance, regular

check and compulsory logging may remind OOWs of the entry and prevent inputting
wrong information.

If violating COLREGs is principally forbidden in bridge

procedures, AIS would not be used as a catalyst for agreeing on a course of action
which is in conflict with these rules.

Memory failures, like failing to change the

navigation status, destination and draught information will also be effectively
eliminated if proper requirements are set and implemented.
5.5 Approaches to Cope with AIS-related Human Errors
Reason (1990, p.1) argues that modern technology has now reached a point where
improved safety can only be achieved on the basis on of a better understanding of
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human error mechanisms.
the complexity.

Human errors are very difficult to be eliminated due to

Fu (2004) recommended that human error should be controlled

through three aspects:
(1) Control and minimize the factors might cause human error;
(2) Prevent the occurrence of accidents in case of human error; and
(3) Control and minimize the consequence if case accidents happen due to human
error.
To effectively cope with various human errors regarding AIS, recommendations are
listed as the followings:
--Consider AIS nothing more than one of the tools assisting navigational safety and
never let the attention be distracted.

ICS urges seafarers to use AIS equipment as

an aid, not as an excuse for failing to look out of the bridge window.

It has been

suggested mariners not to use AIS information alone for critical decisions such as
collision avoidance (Patraiko, 2004 and Hinchliffe, 2002).
--Operational training is necessary. It can not be acceptable to put AIS onboard to
achieve full capabilities only with an hour or two instructions form the manufactures.
The training syllabus should at least embrace (1) basic knowledge and operation; (2)
limitations; and (3) how to interpret and correlate information with other sources.
--Bridge procedures should consist of requirements concerning proper AIS operation.
For instance, OOWs should be advised to make an entry in the log after data
updating (Stitt, 2004), and to routinely check the accuracy of own ship’s static,
dynamic and voyage-related data being transmitted.
--Passing arrangements should not be made through AIS messaging. COLREGs
should prevail at all times.

Making private passing arrangements would be

dangerous because other nearby ships, even if they were equipped with AIS, would
not be aware of the arrangements.
--Harmonize the input of information such as destinations, by adopting an available
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universal protocol to unify the presentation of navigation information in such a way
as to avoid confusion in the display of such information.

When using MKD

graphical display in conjunction with radar, it is important to use similar orientation
(heads-up, course up) to avoid confusion.
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Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

6.1 Better Understanding of AIS
Automatic Identification System (AIS) technology, providing a means of exchanging
a precisely defined range of information between ships, reduces the number of
near-misses and collisions because it will significantly improve the OOW’s ability to
anticipate and avoid potential collisions.

It holds the promises of minimizing VHF

communication by clearly identifying targets.
Due to various reasons such as an accelerated time schedule and limited experience,
more efforts are focused on meeting the minimum requirement of AIS in terms of its
performance, leaving less address on human elements involved.

Thus, there are the

possibilities of misuse and unintended negative consequence, which makes it
impractical to achieve AIS full capabilities and facilitates the future development.
The human elements ought to be emphasized basically to embrace ergonomic
designing, machine/human interface, workload, mental stress and human errors.
Recommendation 1: The whole shipping industry should attach more importance to
a better and more comprehensive understanding of AIS while enjoying its apparent
promising benefits.

To acquire necessary lessons from first AIS-assisted maritime

accident, it is imperative for all stakeholders of AIS technology to put more address
on the considerations of human elements.
Recommendation 2: In China, more attention should be paid to OOWs’ competence
and qualification regarding AIS operational issues since domestic-route ships are
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required to carry AIS gradually9.

A systematic implementation plan and schedule

for AIS carriage might be needed.
6.2 The Critical Role of Ergonomics and Interface
Ergonomics is greatly related to human performance because it is the study and
design of working environments and their components, work practices, and work
procedures for the benefit of worker’s productivities, health, comfort and safety.

In

the context of current AIS, ergonomics mainly refers to the location of Minimum
Keyboard Display (MKD).
The poorly designed ergonomics can be argued to impose negative effects to the full
capabilities of AIS.

The separated installation makes the correlation between

targets reported by AIS and ARPA more detrimental, particularly when they are close
in range/bearing and where other targets exist.
From the perspective of OOWs, the AIS interface can be defined as the display and
control mechanisms that enable the exchange of information between the person and
the AIS.

This interface represents an opportunity for significant improvements in

available knowledge and awareness of waterways and vessel traffic situations for all
mariners.
It is argued that for AIS to meet its stated objective of promoting safe vessel
navigation, an effective onboard interface with the vessel’s operator is essential. How
effective and productive the AIS will be depends greatly on whether the interface is
user-friendly or not. As the dominant interface, MKD has basic functionality to
display the data needed. However, due to inherent deficiencies and clumsy designing,
MKD imposes tangible inconveniences to OOWs.
Recommendation 3: The ergonomic consideration should be settled in the designing
stage.

It is believed that address needs to be given as to the placement of the

display for effective use, such as its proximity to radars and VHFs.

9

See Document No. 406 issued on Oct.14, 2005 by China MSA
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Recommendation 4: AIS displays should be introduced carefully and thoughtfully so
that the needs of OOWs are met without overburdening them with inessential
information and inconvenient operations.
Recommendation 5: In China, more considerations should be given to the fact that
most OOWs in domestic routes have inadequate capabilities of English language.
What they need from AIS and how the information is displayed must be defined and
evaluated sufficiently well. Developing appropriate requirements for the minimum
information display of AIS is essential for domestic route ships.
6.3 Workload Reduced and Induced by AIS
As a new technology, AIS is introduced as an approach of reducing workload and
improving human performance in the navigational system.

Within the element of

understanding is the notion that AIS can increase workload and mental stress if it is
used properly.
It is of great value to analyze as a whole the workload reduced and induced by the
introduction of AIS. Four categories of workload are decreased after the usage of
AIS. OOWs enjoy less VHF communication, less effort in identifying targets, more
situation awareness and less stress from judging the situation. Nevertheless, new
patterns of workload are triggered at the same time due to the unique nature of AIS.
Interpreting and correlating the information between AIS and other resources,
various stresses from menu-operation, incomprehension, uncertainty and interrupting
alarms are typical types.
The answer to this question whether AIS really reduces OOWs’ workload or not
varies case by case due to a number of reasons. In general, the workload induced
relates considerably with OOWS’ competencies and skills. They need to be able to
control the menus with skills and to interpret and correlate the information in the
appropriate way.

Sometimes these problems can be solved by more effective

operator training.
Recommendation 6: Amplifying the benefits of AIS and reducing various workload
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and stress induced by AIS should be always born into minds.

AIS technology must

evolve in a manner meeting the needs of active seafarers and incorporating the
consideration of reducing workload as a whole.
Recommendation 7: In China, training and practicing should be encouraged to
promote OOWs’ skills and competence in the usage of AIS, regardless of the
revolutionary improvements on AIS displays may be achieved.
6.4 Human Error Triggered by AIS
Identifying those errors makes navigators more aware of the inherent limitations of
AIS technology at current status and helps to avoid apparent or potential hazards.
Basic levels of human error including skill-based error, rule-based error and
knowledge-based error are also applied in the implementation of AIS.

Skill-based

errors embrace those stemming from memory or attentional failures, connected with
the transmission of navigation status and misspelling. Rule-based errors, resulted
from the lack of clearly defined rules, are found in the unintelligible abbreviations
regarding destinations, master’s discretion of switching off the MKD and addition of
inappropriate comments.

Knowledge-based errors, considerably related to OOWs’

competence, are mainly derived from the interpretation of AIS information.
Violations are also found in the implementation course.

Evidences show that

OOWs are more likely to violate COLREGs due to the introduction of AIS.

Also,

AIS information might be misused for illness purposes.
The potential hazards to navigation safety are tremendous if these human errors are
not attached sufficient importance in the application of AIS.

Hazards include

failing to make quick and precise decisions, confusing the vicinity ships and
undermining the effectiveness of AIS technology.
Recommendation 8: Reasons for the occurrence of human errors should be carefully
analyzed, especially after the first AIS-assisted accident has happened.

Efforts

should be further made to clarify training programs and standards, to ensure OOWs’
awareness of AIS limitations and to incorporate operational requirements in the
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bridge procedures.
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Appendix One

Example of Improper Information

Notes: The M/V GUO YU 6 HAO, shown in VTS screen, is proceeding in the route
off Shanghai port. The route is in an opposite direction of WU HAN that is indicated
as her destination from the AIS.
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Appendix Two

Notes of the Practical Survey

Notes of First Day’s Interview
On January 23, 2006 the author boarded six container ships at Zhanghuabang Terminal.
Four of them are from China shipping companies and two other ships are from Germany.
The author interviewed six deck officers (two third officers, two second officers and two
chief officers). All of them are familiar with the AIS and the author did not find any wrong data
in their respective equipment.
As recognized generally, AIS is helpful for navigational activities, i.e. identifying targets.
They do not think it is a burden for deck officer to input the voyage-related information including
destination, ETA, draught, cargo, etc. One of the interviewees believed that the entry of data
could be done correctly within two minutes.
Three of the interviewees always use AIS as an assistant tool to conduct collision prevention
activities. One third officer never consults AIS equipment because he thinks radar is more
reliable and the time is limited. He states that if situation permitting, he prefers to use Radar or
his eyes to judge the situation. He thinks, furthermore, it is not allowed to identify all the targets
through AIS when proceeding in congested waters. However, he recognized that AIS is
particularly helpful in foggy weather.
All of them complain the small size of MKD. They feel inconvenient to input and check the
data when necessary. One second officer confesses that he suffers a lot from the small screen of
AIS because the screen could not display all the targets he need in some time. He has to up or
down the pages to identify the target ship several miles away.
One of the interviewees adds that it is likely to identify the wrong vessel when targets are
close to each other. The third officer does not think so. He states that with the information of
position and bearing from the APPA radar, the AIS target is easily identified. (On his ship, the
MKD is set very close to the radar screen)
All of them feel accustomed to the operation of AIS although two of them mentioned a little
nervous at the very beginning.
They always check the data before communicate with other ships.
None of them has taken a training program before. Three interviews believe it unnecessary
to receive such a training program because the instructions on board are clear enough. One of the
chief officers thinks it would be better to have a training course but it dose not matter whether
there will be an examination or not.
All of them believe the AIS and radar screen should be closely located. One of the
interviewees strongly complains that it takes time when two equipments are separated.
They all recommend the integration of AIS and radar or ECDIS.
Two interviewees (in the same ship) mention the poor signal that results in failing to receive
information.
From the interview, there is no sign of over-reliance on AIS. On the contrary, two of them
hint a little suspicion of the reliance of AIS information because so many ships are inputting
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wrong information or even ignore the usage of AIS.
They all mention that a number of ships are inputting wrong information or even ignore the
usage of AIS. One of the chief mates estimated that in the past, about half of ships made mistakes
in entering voyage related data, however at present, the quality of information is improved and
the number of ships who make mistakes has been reduced to 20% approximately. He guesses the
reason is the strictness from the Administration and company management.
One interviewee complains the number of items displayed on the small screen. Three pages
are needed to display all the items whereas some of them like call sign, length, width and so on.
He selected four of the mot useful items including name, CPA, COG and destination.
One interviewee intentionally set Zero as the alarming CPA. He explained that too many
alarms in the bridge will confuse the OOW and if the CPA is set one mile, there will be too many
alarms when proceeding in busy waters.
None of them has ever released the safety related information. The second officer even
believes this function is useless.
There is a sign of reluctance of using AIS when situation is urgent or time is limited or the data is
confusing.
One of the interviewees hints his worries of the performance of non-English speakers
although he urges the implementation of AIS for all coasters.
Two ships’ AIS equipments are installed about 1.5 meters away from the radar screen. One ship’s
AIS equipment is within the reach of OOW when he is watching the radar screen.
Notes of Second Day’s Interview
On January 25th 2006, the author boarded four container ships at Waigaoqiao Terminal and
interviewed one chief officer and three third officers. The chief officer who is from Russia, works
for the APL shipping while the Chinese third officer works for China Shipping.
All of them are familiar with the AIS and the author has not found any wrong data in their
respective equipment.
As recognized generally, AIS is helpful for navigational activities, i.e. identifying targets.
They do not think it is a burden for deck officer to input the voyage-related information
including destination, ETA, draught, cargo, etc. One third officer believes that the entry of data
could be done correctly within one minute. However, the chief officer has a great complain about
the small size of keyboard. He considers it inconvenient and time-consuming for him to input all
the data. He recommends AIS equipment should use a computer keyboard.
All of the interviewees always use AIS as an assistant tool to conduct collision prevention
activities.
All of them do not think it is a problem to identify the targets through AIS when proceeding
in congested waters. The chief officer thinks it is possible and simple. None of them thinks it is
likely to identify the wrong vessel when targets are close to each other.
The chief officer complained the small size of MKD whereas two third officers believe it is
all right. However, the chief officer is very accustomed with the AIS. As he says, the operation is
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like mobile phone. So he does not think it necessary for him to receive a training program. He
does agree that there are too many sub-manus that need to shift for reading messages or inputting
data. As far as the design of menu is concerned, he thinks it depends on different manufacturers.
During the interview, the author finds that his AIS displays ships with their course, distance
and MMSI on the first page. The chief complains a lot about this because there are no ships’
names on the first page, only with MMSI. However, the nearest three ships’ names are displayed
on the first page.
The chief officer who used to have experienced the radar system with an integration of AIS
does not think the integration is a good thing because the real target may be reflected into two
targets in the screen. The displayed information is confusing and misleading. However, he
believes the integration of AIS into ECDIS is a perfect thing.
They always check the data before communicate with other ships.
None of them has taken a training program before and believes it necessary to receive such a
training program.
All of them believe the AIS and radar screen should be closely located.
From the interview, two third officers seem a little over-relied on AIS. On the contrary, the
chief officer does not think he is over relied on the AIS.
They all mention that a number of ships are inputting wrong information or even ignore the
usage of AIS. One third officer estimates around 10% ships do not enter their names in the AIS.
The third officers only consult the ship’s name before communicating with the relevant ship. The
chief officer will check other information before communication.
The chief officer switches off the alarming system to reduce the number of alarm on the
bridge. He suggests the maximum number of alarms on the bridge should not exceed four.
Notes of Third Day’s Interview
On January 26th 2006, the author boarded ten container ships at Waigaoqiao Terminal to get
statistics of the location of MKD. No officers are interviewed in detail.
After three days’ survey, the following table can explain the location of MKD in 20 ships:
Location of MKD
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Close Located

Chart Room
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Bridge Window

Appendix Three Questionnaire about the Usage and Application of Shipboard AIS
Dear Sir:
This questionnaire is used for a recent research about the true situation of AIS usage and
application. You are greatly appreciated if you choose the answer that you truly prefer. What you
do may help us improve the effectiveness of AIS application in China. Therefore, we are so
grateful for your frankness and cooperation.
The answers you choose have NOTHING to do with the results of PSC inspection or
other formalities. This questionnaire is conducted voluntarily and anonymously.
1. What problems do you often meet when you are inputting static data, dynamic data or voyage
related data, safety and security related messages?
□A. No problems at all.
□B. Only small mistakes, like slips (attention failure) or lapse (memory failure).
□C. Sometimes I feel a little unfamiliar with the menu, but finally I can handle it.
□D. It is difficult for me to input the data every time, because the time is so limited.
E. Others (Please specify)

2. How often do you use AIS as an assistant tool to prevent collision?
□A. Always (More than 60% times).
□B. Sometimes (Around 30% times).
□C. Seldom (Less than 20% times)
□D. Never, because I think Radar is more reliable or because I do not like to check the data in
AIS within such a short time.
E. Others (Please specify)

3. What do you think of the Minimum Keyboard and Display?
□A. It is too small. I feel inconvenient to input or consult the data.
□B. It is O.K., but needs improvement.
□C. It is a burden for deck officer.
□D. It works well, and helps a lot.
E. Others (Please specify)

4. What do you feel when you are using AIS to avoid collision or to do other operations (i.e.
communicating with other ships, receiving safety and security related messages )?
□A. I feel very accustomed to it.
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□B. I feel a little nervous or excited because I am not very familiar with the operations.
□C. I feel a little suspicious of the reliability of the AIS.
D. Others (Please specify)
5. Before you communicate with other ships, do you check the data in AIS to identify her name?
□A. Always.
□B. Sometimes, if there is enough time.
□C. Seldom.
D. Others (Please specify)

6. Do you satisfy with the performance of AIS (only with the Minimum Keyboard and Display)?
A. Yes, because
B. No, because
C. Others (Please specify)

7. What will you recommend to improve the friendliness of AIS interface? (You may have more
than one choice)
□A. Reduce the items in the static, dynamic and voyage information
□B. Integrate the AIS data into the radar or ECDIS system
□C. Set the Minimum Keyboard and Displayer beside the Radar
□D. Redesign the complicated menu
E. Others (Please specify)

8. Have you taken a training program BEFORE?
□ A. NEVER
□ B. YES，if so，THEN
 What kind of training program have you attended?
□Shore-Based Training program for MKD AIS
□On Borading CD training
9. Do you think the training program for use of AIS necessary?
□YES
□NOT
10. Does the Bridge Procedure on board your ship cover the proper use of AIS?
□YES
□NO
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11. There are too many sub-menus that need to shift for reading messages or inputting data.
□ I agree
□ I don’t agree
12. The design of menu as well as submenu is not user-friendly.
□ I agree
□ I don’t agree
13. Anything else would you like to comment on the use of AIS?
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